Dates: ?-1883

Ntshingwayo commanded the Zulu force that inflicted one of the most stunning defeats suffered by British forces, challenging the might of Queen Victoria’s Empire.

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Very little is known about ‘Inkosi’ (Chief) Ntshingwayo KaMahole of the Khoza people other than he was one of King Cetshwayo’s principal advisers and the commanding general at the Zulu victory of Isandlwana on 22 January 1879. Since this battle is viewed as one of the greatest military disasters of the whole Victorian period, which included such martial horrors as the Charge of the Light Brigade (1854) and the Retreat from Kabul (1842), Ntshingwayo KaMahole must rank as one of the most important enemy commanders the British Army has faced.

The Anglo-Zulu War grew out of border disputes, the unease amongst the British governors of Natal about potential Zulu expansion into their territory and a desire that the Zulus co-operate with their plan for imperial federation in South Africa. Despite their warlike history and the martial organisation of the Zulu social system, it appears unlikely that King Cetshwayo would have made a direct attack upon British possessions. Nevertheless, after issuing ultimatums that the Zulus found unacceptable, most notably for the disbandment of their army, and ignoring the wishes of the government in London, the British launched a full-scale invasion of Zululand in January 1879.

Initially, Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford, the British commander, was concerned less with the thought of the Zulus attacking his field force, than with the possibility that they would not fight at all. To deal with this he split his army into three columns advancing into Zululand to the north, centre and south of the country. But his hopes of a complacent enemy overawed by European firepower were to be disappointed. It was on the centre column, camped at the mountain of Isandlwana, that the hammer blow fell. King Cetshwayo split his army to match the invading columns and appointed Ntshingwayo to be the commander of the units dispatched to meet the centre column. This Zulu force numbered between 19,000 and 24,000 men.

Ntshingwayo’s forces attacked in the classic Zulu fighting formation, ‘The Horns of the Buffalo’, with the older stronger soldiers making up the ‘chest’ and the ‘loins’ while the younger faster men were the ‘horns’ which would sweep out and encircle the trapped enemy. They caught the encamped soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot unprepared. The garrison attempted to form an extended firing line some distance forward and at right angles to the camp, but this was soon outflanked. Attempting to fall back, the troops were forced to form several small squares, in which they fought to the death. The official casualty return listed 858 Europeans and 471 Africans killed.

From the moment that the battle was lost the British sought to explain how native infantry armed with spears, clubs and a few outdated muskets could defeat a European army equipped with modern weapons. It has been claimed that the British were defeated because their ammunition wagons were too far away, or because the ammunition boxes were screwed shut or due to the inexperience or rashness of their commanders. Ultimately however, the British forces at Isandlwana were beaten because the Zulu ‘amabutho’ (regiments) contained superbly disciplined, experienced soldiers with far more training in hand-to-hand combat than their opponents. ‘A bayonet with some guts behind it’, however daunting, could not stand up to a warrior with years of training and battlefield experience in close quarter combat, especially when the latter had an overwhelming numerical superiority. In the final analysis, Ntshingwayo KaMahole outfought his British opponent and controlled, inspired and directed one of the most effective armies ever to take the field.

The effects of the catastrophic defeat echoed around the Empire. In the hope of diverting public attention away from the disaster Disraeli’s government seized upon the successful defence of Rorke’s Drift against a smaller Zulu force (22-23 January), issuing 11 VCs to the survivors. It did not work and Disraeli’s administration, already foundering on the issue of foreign policy, was brought down in part by Ntshingwayo’s generalship.

After the battle the British forces withdrew, but later re-invaded and successfully deposed Cetshwayo. The king lived in exile for a few years but then briefly reclaimed his throne, only to lose it again in a bloody coup. One of the victims of this 1883 uprising, kllled in defence of his king, was Ntshingwayo KaMahole.