It has often been debated what winning a war or conflict actually entails. While 'winning' might be considered a fundamental part of the human objective, the question of what it actually means and how one might achieve it remain somewhat abstract, in war as in any other human endeavour.
'Winning' militarily has always been more quantifiable at the tactical level - in a firefight or a battle - than at the strategic level. Strategically, success might be measured by means of three big ideas: ownership, intervention for effect, and fighting for ideas. The divergence between success at the tactical level and the political context of the war creates a challenge at the operational level, when it relates to political and strategic matters.
Join Matthias Strohn and other contributors as they examine a selection of historical case studies, weaving together the philosophical components of victory with the factual events of the past.
Professor Matthias Strohn is Honorary Visiting Professor in the Humanities Research Institute at the University of Buckingham. He is Head of Historical Analysis at the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR), the British Army’s strategic think tank, and an academic member of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Professor Strohn is also a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and a member of the British Commission for Military History.